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Because of the prominent position of urban rail in reducing urban transport-related 
problems, such as congestion and air pollution, insights into the costs of possible new urban 
rail projects is very relevant for those involved with cost estimations, policy makers, cost-
benefit analysts, and other target groups. Knowledge of the differences in costs per kilometre, 
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including explanations of differences and their breakdowns is currently lacking in the 
literature. This paper aims to provide a first stage insight into how cost per kilometre varies 
across urban rail projects. The methodology applied is a simple cost comparison across 
projects where the data collected are comparable. We conclude that capital costs per route-
kilometre of urban rail vary highly between projects. Looking at European projects and 
excluding outliers, the total capital costs per route-kilometre (including stations and rolling 
stock) lie mainly between US$50-100 million (2002 prices). Including US projects, the range 
is US$50-150 million. The main reasons for the high variation in the route-kilometre costs 
are differences between projects as regards the ratio of underground to above-ground 
construction, ground conditions, station spacing, type of rolling stock, environmental and 
safety constraints and labour costs. We warn, however, that the observations used to reach 
the conclusions are too few to obtain results with statistical significance. Our results must 
therefore be seen as a first step towards collecting more data so that a more succinct 
statistical analysis can be conducted. Another conclusion is therefore that this area has 
future research potential. 
 
Keywords: Urban rail, turn-out capital costs, per-kilometre costs, per-station costs, cost 
uncertainty, financial risk 
1. Introduction 
Most large urban areas in western countries, as well as in developing countries, face major 
transport problems. Congestion levels are high, demand for parking capacity increasingly 
exceeds supply, concentrations of pollutants exceed WHO levels, and about 20 percent of the 
European Union’s population suffer from unhealthy noise levels (European Commission, 
1996). Whilst the numbers of fatalities are generally decreasing, they are still at a high and 
often politically unacceptable level. In Europe, as in other regions, solutions for these 
problems involve both push measures – such as the congestion charge in London and tolls in 
some Norwegian cities – and pull measures, such as improving public transport, as well as, 
sometimes, a combination of push and pull measures, such as in London where revenue from 
the congestion charge is used to improve public transport. Public transport infrastructure 
improvements are high on the agenda of pull measures in many cities, partly inspired by 
success stories such as Karlsruhe (Germany), or Strasbourg (France). Because of intensive 
land use in large urban areas in Europe, especially in central urban areas, improved public 
transport often involves underground systems.  
An important question in the discussion on possible new urban rail projects is: will the costs 
be compensated for by the benefits? Currently, cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is the most 
recognised ex ante evaluation method for transport infrastructure projects (Hayashi and 
Morisugi, 2000). However, scientific discussions and guidelines (e.g. those in the UK and in 
the Netherlands) focus more on the valuation of benefits than the quality of cost estimates. 
This is surprising, as estimates of costs are highly uncertain, with cost over-runs being the 
rule rather than the exception. Rail projects on average perform even worse than roads, with 
an average cost over-run of 45 percent (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003).   
The costs of infrastructure projects have recently attracted considerable attention in the 
literature (e.g. Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; Odeck, 2004; see Van Wee, 2007 for a review of the 
literature) but this work mainly focuses on cost over-runs and explanatory factors, and very 
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little on unit costs, such as costs per kilometre. We did find some references to costs per 
kilometre for rail projects, but they only examined cost changes over time (e.g. Cox and 
Love, 1995), and not how unit costs vary across projects. 
This paper aims to provide further insights into the unit costs of urban rail projects. The 
quality of urban rail projects as well as the CBA of those projects could be improved from 
such insights, and the decision making might also benefit. More specifically, we believe the 
results may prove useful to those interested in the costs of urban rail, including planners, cost 
engineers, project appraisers and investors. This paper therefore attempts to answer the 
following questions: 
1. What are the average costs per kilometre of urban metro rail projects constructed in 
the recent past? 
2. Which factors contribute to the explanation of differences observed in unit costs? 
3. Into which categories can the urban rail project costs be broken down? 
We consider our research as a first step towards a more succinct statistical analysis of these 
factors, given that there is little data at our disposal and no statistical inference can be 
conducted. Another aim of the paper is to reflect on the possible implications of our findings 
for further research in this area. 
Section 2 describes briefly the method used. Section 3 describes the data; Section 4 the 
results and Section 5 contains a summary of the main conclusions.  
2. Methodology 
The approach we used in this study is a simple comparison of the unit costs of urban rail 
projects that have been built in Europe, supplemented by some data from the US and 
elsewhere. In general, studies of this type should encompass a succinct statistical assessment 
where inferences can be made with respect to the significance of the results derived.  
However, because the number of projects considered in the present study was low due to 
unavailability of data, we resorted to a simpler approach, which gives insights into the cost 
differences that may be useful for those involved with cost estimations, planners and decision 
makers. As we later recommend, this area deserves future research encompassing more data 
gathering and statistical analysis to reach firm conclusions. Hence, our study must be seen as 
a first stage in such an endeavour. 
3. Data  
Data for the present analysis was used in several stages. In the first stage cost data for urban 
rail systems and lines were collected as part of a wider research into the costs and cost over-
runs of transport infrastructure projects. In the second stage a decision was made as to which 
types of projects would be further considered. We decided to focus on urban rail projects in 
densely populated areas in Europe as it is seldom an area of focus as far as implementation 
costs are concerned. Further, focusing on this area gives a homogenous type of project that 
enables a worthwhile comparison of costs. Projects were selected that were wholly or at least 
partly underground as tunnelling is a key element in most European rail infrastructure 
projects. Secondly, European projects were considered more relevant than projects from the 
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USA or other nations as the focus of the research is on Europe, although examples of non-
European nations are included. Thirdly, data on light rail and commuter rail have not been 
included.  
The quality of data gathered is also an issue to consider. The data collection exercise showed 
that capital cost data, as found in the records of the owners and managers of urban rail and in 
the reports produced by consultants and researchers, are highly uneven regarding 
specifications and quality. It is often not clear which items are included in a specific cost 
measure, for instance whether or not costs include land, rolling stock, management costs, 
taxes, etc. Moreover, it is sometimes unclear whether costs are given in constant or current 
prices and to which year a given cost figure pertains. As a result one has to be careful not to 
make the apples-and-oranges error when comparing cost figures for one system with those 
for another, including benchmarking one system with data from others.  
Taken together, such problems typically make the data on costs that are immediately avail-
able for a given urban rail system or line unsuited for comparative studies. Therefore, before 
data on unit capital costs were used for comparison and benchmarking purpose, three steps 
were taken: 
1. Costs are compared for similar systems i.e. urban rail, European projects and at least 
partly underground projects, to ensure homogeneity in the data  
2. Costs were expressed in constant (real) prices, using construction cost indices to 
discount costs to the same level (year).  
3. Costs calculated in different currencies were converted into the same currency, 
typically US$ or €, by applying the appropriate exchange rates.  
In (2) and (3) above, we first took the estimate of the cost in a given currency for a specific 
year. That cost was then updated to 2002 using the construction cost index for that country 
using OECD (see OECD, 1997). Finally the 2002 average exchange rate was used to translate 
the figures into US$. Where a construction cost index was not available, the index of the US 
was used.  The reason for using the US index is that most of the projects are without a local 
index in Latin American countries. US construction costs is assumed to be more relevant than 
European costs. 
Our cost estimates reflect all the costs accrued until the moment the project opens, i.e. the 
first year the project was completed and brought into use. Costs that were incurred after the 
opening, e.g. due to minor shortcomings, were excluded. This is because it is difficult to 
distinguish between repairs of faults that occurred in the construction phases from 
maintenances. Furthermore, data availability did not make that distinction possible. It should 
be noted that the word ‘costs’ is used from the perspective of the client and may thus include 
the contractor’s margin. One could argue that a better word would be ‘prices’, because we 
focus on the prices paid for the projects, not the real costs – costs would imply ignoring 
profits and losses. However, to be in line with the literature we use the word ‘costs’ instead of 
‘prices’. To be clear, costs as used here is what was incurred or paid by the building 
authorities to realize the project. 
There are however, additional factors other than the ones described above which may help to 
explain the differences between projects. These include differences related to time periods 
and the country/region of construction. Construction costs can easily differ due to changes in 
the real costs of the construction industry and local market circumstances during the 
construction period.  In addition one could argue that the level of cost over-runs could be 
included: a project could be more expensive than necessary simply because of cost over-runs. 
But this is not as straightforward as it seems: initial cost estimates are often biased for 
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strategic reasons, and therefore unusable as ‘realistic’ costs for which the projects could have 
been constructed (Flyvbjerg, 2007b). We are the first to admit that our approach to data 
collection must be considered as a first step towards acquiring sufficient data for this type of 
study. We recommend therefore that these two issues, the impact of time periods and the 
country/region of construction be subjects for further research. 
4. Results 
Given the methodology discussed above, which basically compares the implementation costs 
across a set of homogenous rail projects in Europe, and given the data described in section 3, 
we can now address the three questions posed in section (1). 
4.1 Do Capital Costs per Route-kilometre differ between Metros? 
The question posed in this section is what the average costs per kilometre of urban rail 
projects constructed in the recent past are. We distinguish between the unit costs for the total 
project and the unit costs for stations only. 
Table 1 presents the results for three groups of European projects. Projects were firstly 
selected applying the criteria as presented in section 2. Secondly, as we aimed to give a good 
impression of the range in the values of variables, we selected projects selectively rather than 
randomly. Total capital costs per route-kilometre include stations. It should also be 
mentioned that the costs quoted for the Copenhagen metro cover 21 kilometres, of which 
only 11 had been completed at the time of the survey; turn-out per-kilometre costs for the 21 
kilometres may therefore differ from the figure in the table. The indicated costs for the 
Toulouse VAL Line A extension are also an estimate. 
Table 1 illustrates well a general characteristic of metro systems: capital costs per kilometre 
vary significantly from project to project, here the lowest unit costs are for the Hannover U-
Bahn and the highest for the London Jubilee Line extension. The Hannover U-Bahn has an 
even lower unit cost than the Madrid extension - well-known for its low costs -  which can be 
explained by the fact that only 17 percent of the metro in Hannover is underground. 
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Table 1. Capital costs per route-kilometre for selected urban rail projects. 
 Opening year 
Length 
km 
Vertical 
segregation 
Number of 
stops. Stop 
spacing km 
Capital 
costs 
(million) 
Costs/km 
(million) 
Cost/km 
(million) 
2002-US$ 
Copenhagen Metro 
Phases 1-3 2002-07 21 
48% tunnel 
52% elevated 
22 
1.0 DKK 11,400 
DKK 
542.9 69.8 
London Jubilee Line 
extension 1999 16 
78% tunnel 
22% at ground 
level 
NA 
NA GBP 3,600 GBP 225 329.9 
Madrid Extension 
1995-99  1999 56.3 
68% tunnel 
32% at ground 
level 
38 
1.5 NA US$22.8 26.7 
Toulouse 
VAL Line A 1993 9.7 
90% tunnel 
10% elevated 
15 
0.6 FRF 3,700 FRF 381.4 60.9 
Toulouse 
VAL Line A 
extension 
2004 2.2 NA 3 0.7 € 187.5 € 85.2 81.1 
Marseille Lines 1-2 1977-92 19.6 
80% tunnel 
12% elevated 
8% at ground 
level 
24 
0.8 FRF 6,343 FRF 323.7 59.1 
Lille VAL RT 1988 29 75% tunnel 25% above 
NA  
0.7 FRF 8,900 FRF 306.9 56.0 
Lyon Ligne D 1991-97 14 NA 15 0.9 FRF 7,300 FRF 521.4 79.5 
Paris Meteor Phase 
1 1998 7.2 NA 
7 
1.0 US$ 1,419 US$ 197.1 220.0 
Marseille Line 1 
extension 2006 2.5 NA 
4 
0.6 € 175,4 € 70.2 68.8 
Toulouse VAL 
Line B 2007 15 NA 
20 
0.8 € 968 € 64.5 63.2 
London Victoria 
Line 1968-69 15.8 100% tunnel 
NA 
1.3 € 740.5 € 46.9 63.1 
Vienna Stage 1 1984 NA NA NA NA NA € 70 94.2* 
Berlin U-Bahn NA 4.6 100% tunnel 5 0.9 US$ 275 US$ 59.8 88.3* 
Hannover U-Bahn NA  69.0 17% tunnel 
110 
0.6 US$ 750 US$ 10.9 16.1* 
Hannover U-Bahn 
extension NA 2.8 100% tunnel 
NA 
NA US$ 108 US$ 38.5 56.9* 
Turin Metro Phase 1 2005 9.6 100% tunnel 15 0.6 GBP 442 GBP 40 71.7 
 
NA: Not available. 
*Exchange rate for the indicated year was not available to convert to local currency. Construction cost index has 
been applied directly in EUR/US. 
Note: Taxes were included for Madrid (16%). Status of taxes for London, Vienna, Berlin, Hannover, and Turin 
was unknown. Other projects: taxes not included. 
 
We now broaden the scope to projects outside the EU. Tables 2 and 3 present data for 12 
metros in the USA and other non-European countries. 
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Table 2. Capital costs per route-kilometre for six metros in the USA. 
 
Washing-
ton, DC 
Metro 
Atlanta 
MARTA
Baltimore 
Metro
Section 
A&B
Los Angeles
North 
Hollywood 
extension
Atlanta 
North Line 
extension 
San Francisco 
BART Airport 
extension
Opening year 1985 1986 1983 2000 2000-03 2002
Length km 97.3 43.1 12.2 10.1 3.7 14.0
% in tunnel, elevated, 
at ground level 57% tunnel 42% tunnel 56% tunnel NA NA NA
Number of stops 
Stop spacing km 
57 
1.7 
26
1.7
9
1.4
3
3.4
2 
1.85 
4
3.5
Capital costs m 7,968 2,720 1,289 1,311 463.2 1,510.2
Costs/km m US$ 81.9 63.1 105.7 129.8 125.2 107.9
Costs/km m 2002-US$ 114.3 88.0 147.5 131.6 126.9 109.4
 
NA: Not available. 
Note: Status of taxes unknown. 
 
Table 3. Capital costs per route-kilometre for six metros in Asian and Latin American 
nations 
 Singapore Seoul Calcutta Mexico CityLine B
Caracas 
Line 3 
Santiago 
Line 5 
extension
Opening year NA NA NA 2000 1994 2000
Length km 67 116.5 16.5 23.7 4.4 2.8
% in tunnel, 
elevated, at ground 
level 
30% tunnel 80% tunnel 95% tunnel
25% tunnel, 
20% 
elevated
55% at 
ground level
100% tunnel 100% tunnel
Number of stops 
Stop spacing km 
NA 
1.6 
NA
1.1
NA
1.0
21
1.1
4 
1.1 
3
0.9
Capital costs m 2,500 5,240 684 970 372 197
Costs/km m US$ 37.3 45.0 41 40.9 84.5 70.4
Costs/km  
m 2002-US$* 54.5 65.8 59.9 43.8 98.4 71.8
 
NA: Not available. 
* US construction cost index has been applied. 
Note: Taxes included for Mexico City (15%), Caracas (16%) and Santiago (6%). Status of taxes unknown for 
Singapore, Seoul and Calcutta. 
 
In addition to the unit cost figures in tables 1 to 3, the International Association for Public 
Transport, UITP, provided us with the following figures (see table 4). 
 
Table 4. UITP data for selected projects 
Athens US$156 million per route-kilometre 
Cairo US$109               " 
Frankfurt a.m. US$108               " 
Lisbon US$118               " 
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Unfortunately, it was not possible to obtain information regarding the year in which these 
costs were calculated or to which specific metro lines they refer. A figure from UITP for the 
London Jubilee Line of US$375 million per kilometre compared to our figure of US$330 
million per kilometre (see table 1) suggests that the UITP figures may be slightly on the high 
side. 
Nevertheless, these figures and the figures in tables 2 and 3 confirm the initial impression 
from table 1 of large variations between projects in per-kilometre capital costs. The Hannover 
U-Bahn, Madrid metro extension and the London Jubilee line are notable outliers, even when 
seen in the context of the larger number of projects from outside Europe presented in tables 2 
and 3. The American metros in table 2 tend to have higher per-kilometre costs than their 
counterparts both in Europe and in Asian and Latin American countries.  
Excluding the outliers, the US metros and the UITP figures, the total capital costs per 
kilometre for metros is in general between US$50-100 million. Including the US and UITP 
figures the range is US$50-150 million per kilometre. 
As mentioned earlier, the available data include the costs of stations in the total capital costs. 
The data typically do not allow the separating out of stations for independent cost analysis. 
However, Pickrell (1985), in one of the most thorough studies of unit construction costs that 
exists, estimated a cost for underground stations of US$40 million, elevated stations of 
US$23 million and at-grade stations of US$10 million (1983 dollars, see table 5). It should be 
noted, however, that the study was carried out in 1983 and considers North American metros 
only. As with the other estimates of metro unit costs, these figures show large variability. 
 
Table 5. Estimates of unit construction costs relating to stations. 
Component Unit construction costs Millions of 1983 dollars 
Underground stations 40 
Elevated stations 23 
Ground level stations 10 
Two-track km, in tunnel: 
Including stations 
Excluding stations 
 
85 
64 
Two-track km, elevated: 
Including stations 
Excluding stations 
 
34 
24 
Two-track km, at ground level: 
Including stations 
Excluding stations 
 
19 
14 
 
Source: Pickrell 1985, p. 58. 
 
Table 5 shows that including station costs increases project costs by 33-42%. In other words, 
station costs have a share of 25-29 % of the overall project costs. In addition, table 5 shows 
that elevated stations are more than twice as expensive as ground level stations, and that 
underground stations are about four times as expensive as ground level stations. We present 
table 5 only to give data on the share of stations in the total costs rather than to give insights 
into station costs expressed in 2002 prices, and therefore have used Pickrell’s (1985) original 
data.   
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4.2 Explanations of Cost Variations 
In this section we aim to answer the second research question: which factors contribute the 
most to explaining differences in unit costs? 
Our data did not contain enough information to be able to derive specific answers. Therefore, 
in attempting to answer this question we relied on previous literature.  
A key factor in explaining the cost variations between projects is the cost and complexity of 
establishing the right of way (establishing the corridor, including buying the land if needed). 
Costs may be as low as US$10 million per kilometre if an at-grade right of way is available 
for conversion for free, but can rise to over US$200 million per kilometre for an underground 
railway in a difficult urban terrain with troublesome geology, and high costs for land 
acquisition and clearance for stations, relocation and compensation for existing businesses 
and residences, etc. (Halcrow Fox 2000). 
A further factor is whether stations are below, on or above the ground. Halcrow Fox (2000) 
recently found that underground construction for new metros is 4 to 6 times as costly and 
elevated construction 2 to 2.5 times as costly as at-grade construction (see table 6). 
 
Table 6. Typical costs for new-build metros. 
Vertical Alignment All-in costs, US$ million per route-km (2000 prices) Ratio 
Ground level 15-30 1 
Elevated 30-75 2-2.5 
Underground 60-180 4-6 
 
Source: Halcrow Fox (2000). 
 
In a study for the World Bank other factors that strongly impact on route-kilometre costs 
were found to be the quality of management, whether a new system is constructed or lines are 
progressively added to an existing system, and the extent of utilities diversions, 
environmental constraints and safety requirements (BB&J Consult, 2000). Unfortunately no 
information is available with respect to the importance of private versus public finance. In 
addition, costs may be influenced by specific market conditions. For example, if the demand 
for infrastructure construction is higher than the available (regional or national) capacity, 
profit margins could be relatively high, leading to higher ‘costs’ as defined above. In 
addition, financial markets may have an impact on the prices. Both subjects, private versus 
public finance as well as market conditions are interesting areas for further research. 
In a study carried out by BB&J Consult (2000) an analysis was made of the substantial cost 
difference between the recent extension of the Madrid metro and extensions of the metro 
systems in Mexico City, Santiago and Caracas. The analysis relates mainly to tunnel sections. 
To summarise, as far as infrastructure is concerned the findings of BB&J are that the low 
Madrid costs can be explained by: 
1. General reasons, which account for savings of 15-20 million US$/km. These general 
reasons include strong political commitment, a highly experienced project 
management team, and contract procurement not based on the cheapest bid. 
2. Specific reasons related to civil works, accounting for savings of up to 10 million 
US$/km. These include the use of a twin track single tunnel and the Earth Pressure 
Boring Method (EPBM), strong geotechnical supervision, monitoring and stan-
dardised station designs. 
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3. Specific cost reduction in equipment, accounting for up to 10 million US$/km 
savings. These are explained by no air conditioning at stations, limited uninterrupted 
power supply systems, overhead rigid rail or catenary for trains, ATP  (automatic train 
protection) and ATO (automatic train operation), tested technology for signalling and 
telecommunications, and conventional steel wheels.   
4. Specific cost reduction in design, supervision and management accounting for savings 
of 1 to 5 million US$/km, including short construction time, small project 
management team, limited technical assistance and the possibility of exploiting scale 
economics.  
4.3 Breakdown of Capital Costs 
In this section we answer the third research question which is: what are the categories that 
urban rail project costs can be broken down into? 
For six of the metros mentioned in section 4 the available data allow a breakdown of capital 
costs by subsystem. In addition, such a breakdown was available for four metros not 
mentioned earlier (San Francisco BART, Chicago CTA, Boston MBTA and Santiago Line 5). 
For these four projects the total unit costs per kilometre were not available and they were 
therefore not included in section 4. 
Table 7 shows the breakdown of capital costs for five US metros. Table 8 exhibits a similar 
breakdown for the recent Madrid metro extension and the extensions of the three metros in 
Caracas, Mexico City and Santiago, employing a somewhat different itemisation of costs than 
that used for the US metros. For Madrid, the Arganda extension of line 9 has been excluded, 
because it is mainly a surface line and because the focus of the costs analysis quoted was on 
tunnelling. For the US metros, it was possible to separate out the capital costs for stations, 
while this was not the case for the non-US metros. Note that, contrary to previous results, the 
costs of vehicles/rolling stock are included, because the original source included them. For 
the purpose of presenting the results, giving insights into the breakdown of costs, this 
inclusion is not problematic. 
Civil works for guide-ways and stations is the largest cost item for all the metros, except for 
the Mexico City Line B. For the latter, the relatively low percentage of costs for civil works 
and the high percentage of costs for rolling stock are explained by the fact that only 25 
percent of the line is underground (see table 3). 
For the US metros, the costs of engineering, management and tests plus the costs of rolling 
stock are the second most costly items. For the non-US metros, rolling stock is in second 
place, followed by equipment.  
Other cost items, like track, power, traffic control etc., each account for less than ten percent 
of the total costs for the metros studied.  
Finally, it should be noted that the percentage of costs within each item varies substantially 
across projects. Such variation can be explained by differences between projects in the 
percentage of underground construction, the capacity of rolling stock, the extent to which 
goods and services - for instance land and management - were available for free, etc. 
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Table 7. Breakdown of metro capital costs by subsystem for five US metros. 
Subsystem 
San  
Francisco 
BART (%) 
Atlanta 
MARTA 
Phase A (%) 
Baltimore 
MTA 
Phase I (%) 
Chicago 
CTA O'Hare 
(%) 
Boston MBTA 
Red Line South 
(%) 
Land 7 9 2 0 11 
Guideway 37 33 25 20 15 
Stations 19 20 30 28 33 
Trackwork 3 2 2 7 7 
Power 2 1 2 5 6 
Control 4 2 4 8 7 
Facilities 2 3 2 4 0 
Eng./Mgt./Test 14 23 24 8 6 
Vehicles 12 7 9 20 15 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Source: Federal Transit Authority 1992. 
 
Table 8. Breakdown of metro capital costs by item for five metro extensions in Madrid, 
Caracas, Mexico City and Santiago. 
Item Mexico City Line B (%) 
Caracas
Line 3 (%)
Santiago
Line 5 (%)
Santiago Line 5 
extension (%) 
Madrid 
extension excl. 
Arganda (%)
Civil works for 
tunnels only 24.5 32.8 36.4 40.5 54.6
Equipment 18.0 24.2 16.6 13.9 14.2
Rolling stock 36.2 15.7 24.8 21.4 15.4
Design and 
supervision 3.4 3.6 5.5 10.3 1.9
Track 5.3 2.8 6.3 4.3 3.5
Power 5.2 8.9 4.4 2.8 2.4
Signalling and 
communications 4.1 6.8 4.3 5.2 2.7
Station equipment 0.2 2.3 0.7 0.4 1.7
Escalators and lifts 0.3 2.1 0.2 0.9 2.7
Passenger toll 
equipment  0.5 0.7 0.5 0.2 0.3
Workshop equipment 2.3 - 0.3 - 0.6
Total 100 100 100 100 100
 
Source: BB&J Consult (2000) 
5. Conclusions, implications, and further research 
In this paper, we have shown that capital costs per route-kilometre in urban rail vary a great 
deal both in Europe and elsewhere in the world. Our approach has been a simple cost 
comparison across projects with no statistical testing. The variations observed are large, 
involve different types worldwide and imply that researchers, planners and decision makers 
need to worry about their causes. 
From our study, we can derive several conclusions which must be seen as preliminary given 
the data assessed. The first conclusion is that capital costs per kilometre of metro line vary 
substantially between cities, between metro systems and between metro lines within the same 
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city and system. Looking at European projects and excluding outliers, the total capital costs 
per route-kilometre (including stations and rolling stock) lie mainly in the interval US$50-
100 million (2002 prices), stations having a share of about 25-30%.  
The implications of this conclusion are linked to a conclusion from previous studies on 
related subjects. Previous research has concluded that available data on the capital costs for 
transport infrastructure projects show that cost estimates are often highly inaccurate and that 
inaccuracies are particularly high for urban rail (Flyvbjerg, 2007a; Flyvbjerg, Holm and Buhl 
2003, 2004; Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, and Rothergatter, 2003). Our conclusion in this respect, 
combined with the conclusions of earlier research, point to the possibility of using the results 
of ex post analyses as presented in this paper for ex ante forecasting of the costs of urban rail 
projects. Given the variability in the estimated unit costs, we do not see them as being of use 
for estimating the expected costs for proposed new projects. The expected costs of such 
projects will have to be estimated in a conventional way, i.e. by using the project design 
giving information on quantities such as lengths, width, characteristics of bridges etc. and 
unit prices. However, 'our' unit prices could be used as a check on the reasonableness of such 
conventional cost estimates, i.e. they could be used as the basis for posing questions about 
cost estimates in case there are large differences in the costs estimated by the two 
approaches.    
The second conclusion is that the main reasons for the high variation in the route-kilometre 
costs are firstly due to differences between project characteristics, as regards the ratio of 
underground to above-ground construction and ground conditions. Secondly, they may be 
due to management characteristics. Thirdly, civil works for guide-ways carries the largest 
costs for most metros, followed by station costs and the costs of engineering, management 
and tests.  
We consider this research as a first step; it certainly does not provide the final answers to the 
three research questions. Further research is needed to serve project managers, CBA 
researchers and other target groups. This further research could focus on the following 
subjects: 
• The extension of the database, allowing for statistical analysis and modelling. 
• The extension of the scope of the database, resulting in the inclusion of other (urban 
or non-urban) rail projects, in particular light rail and conventional rail,  
• A more sophisticated analysis of cost-explaining factors that are not project specific, 
such as changes in the real costs of the construction industry related to technological 
change, change in construction methods, and changes in prices for inputs depending 
on market factors. 
• Establishing benchmarks for unit costs: establishing these costs in such a way that 
they are suitable for comparison is a methodologically under-developed area. There is 
still a lot of work to be done before final benchmarks can be said to have been 
achieved in a statistically valid fashion.  
• Converting costs to one currency and one year. It must be noted that, excluding the 
Copenhagen metro, the conversion and discounting of costs into 2002-US dollars is a 
first estimate which should be done in more detail if one or more of the projects was 
to be used as a more detailed benchmark for a new project. 
• In depth research, including interviews with project managers and others involved in 
the projects. Such research might focus on best practices, but also on ‘failures’, 
although the latter category might be more difficult because of the dependence on 
collaboration of the persons involved. 
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• Research into the link between costs per kilometre of infrastructure and cost over-
runs: whether there is a significant relationship between both, and if so: why? 
• The development of practically applicable guidelines for CBA research, related to the 
costs of urban rail infrastructure. 
• Research into private versus public finance and into the impacts of specific markets 
(mainly: for construction capacity, for physical inputs, and for finance). 
Related to the first two recommendations, an extended database of higher quality will result. 
This database could very well be used for the method of ‘reference class forecasting’ as 
initially developed by Lovallo and Kahneman (2003) in theory, and worked out in practice 
for transport infrastructure projects by Flyvbjerg (2006). Reference class forecasting consists 
of taking a so-called "outside view" on the particular project being forecast. The outside view 
is established on the basis of information from a class of similar projects. The outside view 
does not try to forecast the specific uncertain events that will affect the particular project, but 
instead places the project in a statistical distribution of outcomes from this class of reference 
projects. 
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